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THE PROBLEM OF AN INSURED DELAYING
NOTICE TO AN INSURER OF A CLAIM
AGAINST THE INSURER: A PROBLEM WITH
PRESUMED PREJUDICE
I. INTRODUCTION
The average insurance policy requires that notice be given to an in-
surer when the insured becomes aware of a claim arising under an insur-
ance policy for which the insurer may be liable.' Notice is the means by
which the insurer becomes aware that a claim may be presented and that
the insured wants the proceeds from the policy. 2 The insurance policy or a
statute may prescribe the time period in which the insured must give no-
tice.- No controversy arises when timely notice is given by the insured to
1. The standard condition found in the 1966 edition of a liability policy relating to no-
tice provides as follows:
Insured's duties in the event of occurrence, claim or suit.
(A) In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to iden-
tify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time,
place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of avail-
able witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any of its author-
ized agents as soon as practicable.
2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 13.01, at 13-14 (1986).
Williston states that "[wlith almost monotonous regularity, insurance policies of every
kind and description stipulated that liability shall arise only when notice is given." 7 S. WIL-
LISTON & W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 918 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS]. Thus, the notice provision is a pervasive element in insurance policies
and insurance coverage.
2. "The notice is not merely to tell the insure[r] that an accident occurred, but rather it
is to alert the insurer that a claim against the policy will be forthcoming." 13A G. COUCH, R.
ANDERSON & M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 49:2, at 227 (rev. ed. 1982). See also
7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 918. The controversy over whether the occur-
rence is to be decided from the viewpoint of the insured or the victim is treated in Rynearson,
Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Damage Under the Occur-
rence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 19 FORUM 513,
521-24 (1984) (generally speaking, the occurrence is to be viewed from the insured's stand-
point before deciding if the occurrence was an accident).
3. See 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.01, at 13-14 for an example of a time period as
stipulated in a policy provision. The following is an example of a statutory provision stipulating
a time period for giving notice:
(5) A provision as follows: NOTICE OF CLAIM: Written notice of a claim must be given to
the insurer within twenty (20) days after the occurrence or commencement of any loss
covered by the policy, or as soon thereafter as is reasonably possible.
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-3 (West 1980) (Life, Accident and Health Insurance: Accident and
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the insurer; but a problem arises when notice is received after the pre-
scribed time period. The question, then, becomes whether to excuse the
delayed notice.' If the delay is excused, the insurer must assume lability for
the claim. If the delay is not excused, the insurer will not be liable for the
claim.' However, some courts have excused the delay where they found that
the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay.
In Miller v. Dilts,' the Indiana Supreme Court stated that a presump-
tion of prejudice arises against the insured when the insurer receives
delayed notice. The presumption can be rebutted only if the insured shows
that the delayed notice did not prejudice the insurer.' This rule imposes a
great burden on the insured to rebut such a presumption, and frequently
results in the loss of his insurance coverage. This loss inequitably denies the
insured the protection for which he contracted.
The courts have devised three general rules for evaluating whether to
excuse a delayed notice. These three rules approach the problem with vary-
ing attitudes towards contract analysis and consumerism.8 The first, and
oldest, rule applies a strict contractual approach; delayed notice is consid-
ered a breach of the insurance contract and the insurer is excused from
performance as the non-beaching party.9 The second rule creates a rebutta-
Sickness Insurance Policy Provision).
4. Long describes the matter in this fashion:
Unreasonable delay precludes recovery under a liability policy which stipulates for notice
as soon as practicable unless there are facts and circumstances which show that notice
was given promptly after the disability has been removed. In making this inquiry, consid-
eration must be given to all of the facts and circumstances in the case, especially those
which tend to show a reasonable excuse for noncompliance or with delay in complying
with the exact requirement for notice.
2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.10, at 13-47-48.
Circumstances which have been used to excuse delayed notice are impossibility of giving
notice within a fixed time, a reasonable belief that the insured was not covered, incapacity of
the insured, ignorance of the insured as to the seriousness or extent of injury or loss. 13A G.
COUCH, supra note 2, §§ 49:90, 49:91, 49:93, 49:94; 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, §§ 13.11-13.13,
13.15. Nevertheless, each excuse must be examined in connection with the specific facts,
before deciding if the delay was reasonable. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.10. Also, the
insured will not be excused for being ignorant of the policy provision requiring notice. 13A G.
CoucH, supra note 2, § 49:92; 44 Am. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1342 (1982) (ignorance of policy
requirements as to notice and proofs of loss).
5. That is, if the excuse is reasonable, then whether an insured has acted reasonably is
left to the trier of fact to decide. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.01.
6. 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984).
7. Id. at 265.
8. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability Insurer to
Show Prejudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured's Failure or Delay in Giving Notice of
an Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1984). See also
infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
9. Annotation, supra note 8, at 146. "The following modern cases support a traditional
proposition ...upon reasoning that such conduct constitutes a breach of contract rendering
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ble presumption of prejudice against the insurer. 10 The third rule uses
prejudice as an element in determining the reasonableness of the delay." In
general, the courts applying the second and third rules have excused a delay
under the following circumstances: when the insured is ignorant of the pol-
icy's coverage;' 2 when the insured is ignorant to the extent of the damage
giving rise to the claim against the insurer;' 3 or when the insured could not
reasonably know that the policy covered a particular event.' 4 The facts de-
termine the result under the last two rules more than the operation of the
rule for these are fact intensive cases.' 5
The purpose of this note is to examine the rules used in excusing
the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer immaterial." Id. All that is required under
this strict contractual approach is that the trier of fact find that the insured failed to give
notice "as soon as practicable" and upon such a finding the insurer is relieved of responsibility
under the policy. Comment, The Materiality of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the
Insured's Failure to Give Timely Notice, 74 DICK. L. REV. 260, 261 (1969-70). A majority of
courts following this approach, however, allow an exception where the terms of the policy are
ambiguous, Id. at 262. Also, this approach has had inconsistencies interjected into it by recog-
nizing prejudicial effects of delayed notice to insurers. Id. at 263.
10. "[A]lthough prejudice to a liability insurer is not entirely immaterial in determining
the consequences of an insured's delay in giving notice of an accident . . . there is nevertheless
a presumption of prejudice raised by such delay." Annotation, supra note 8, at 152. This
approach is meant to mitigate the harshness of the strict contractual approach. Comment,
supra note 9, at 266. The insured is protected from inequitable forfeitures caused by the in-
surer labelling notice as a condition precedent. Id. at 267. The insured is given further protec-
tion by having the issue of prejudice made a jury question. Id.
I1. The purpose of this rule is to avoid the inflexibility of the strict condition precedent
concept. Comment, supra note 9, at 268. The insured has the burden to show compliance with
the condition precedent of notice, the insurer has to introduce proof of prejudice, and if
prejudice is not proven, then the insurer does not escape liability. Id. See also Annotation,
supra note 8, at 156; 2 R. LONG, supra note 1.
12. See 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1343 (1982). Insured is excused for his belief that
the policy did not cover the accident of injury. However, the insured needs to have made a full
investigation before this excuse is available. Id.
13. See 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1345 (1982) (insured excused due to his ignorance
of injury's or loss's seriousness or extent; trivial accidents or injuries). Notice is required once
the injury's seriousness becomes apparent to the insured. Id.
14. See 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1342 (1982) (insured's belief that accident or in-
jury is not covered by policy). The general rule is that if the insured's ignorance about a notice
provision is due to a failure to read the policy, or if read and then forgotten, then the insured is
not excused. Id. In discussing the conflict between the duty to read and the reality of the
insured's reading their policies, see Graham v. Public Employees Nat. Ins. Co., 98 Wash.2d
533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983), see also Comment, Autopsy of a Plain English Insurance Con-
tract: Can Plain English Survive Proximate Cause? - Graham v. Pemco, 59 WASH. L. REV.
565, 579 n.70 (1984).
15. "The question of prejudice is ordinarily a factual issue which should be resolved by
the trier of facts, unless the facts are undisputed and different issues cannot be reasonably
drawn from them. Consequently, the ultimate conclusion in each case must depend on its own
facts." 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.05, at 13-20. In accord with this is Comment, supra
note 9, and 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4732 (1981).
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delayed notice and to propose a rule which will aid in a better evaluation of
whether a delayed notice should be excused. The starting point for the pro-
posed rule is an analysis of Indiana's rule for excusing delayed notice and
the application of that rule by the Indiana courts in these fact sensitive
cases. The first section proposes that the current Indiana rule is unnecessa-
rily burdensome and inequitably denies benefits conferred by an insurance
policy. The following sections proceed to examine the three rules currently
used in analyzing delayed notice; 6 the second section will identify the con-
cept of prejudice and its proper use,' 7 the third section will discuss the con-
cept of notice,18 and the fourth section will present the contractual relation-
ship of insured and insurer.19 The thesis underlying this examination is that
a proper rule requires a clear understanding of each area, and that a proper
rule requires that each area can be analyzed in an easily adaptable manner.
The final section determines that the best standard for analyzing delayed
notice is the reasonableness of the delay rule.20 There are two reasons for
this conclusion: this rule adequately and equitably analyzes the insured's
reasonableness in delaying notice, and, unlike the test in Miller v. Dilts,
properly measures the damage to the insurer's interests.2'
II. THE INDIANA RULE
In Miller v. Dilts, the Indiana Supreme Court created the rule that an
insured's delayed notice gives rise to a presumption of prejudice against the
insurer. The insured can easily rebut any defense by the insurer by showing
that the insurer was not prejudiced. 2 Miller consolidated three cases from
the court of appeals with issues involving cooperation clauses and notice
provisions. 2 The Indiana Supreme Court differentiated between coopera-
16. See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 9 and the discussion there on the reasonableness of the delay rule.
21. Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984). See also infra notes 22-58 and accom-
panying text.
22. Miller, 463 N.E.2d 257. One issue present in Miller was whether there was "no
presumption of prejudice to an insurance company when an insured fails to give reasonable
and timely notice, thus, imposing a burden on the insurance company to show actual prejudice
created by late notice as well as actual prejudice caused by failure to cooperate in order to
avoid liability under the policy." Id. at 261. This is the issue with which this note is principally
concerned. The other issue was whether the notice provision and the cooperation clause both
served the same purpose and had the same effect. For further discussion on this second issue,
see infra note 24.
23. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 260. The cases consolidated for the Miller decision were:
Miller v. Dilts, 453 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Kasonovich v. Meade, 449 N.E.2d 1178
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Williams, 448 N.E.2d 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
All three cases involved automobile accidents. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 259-60. Indiana Ins. Co.
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tion clauses and notice provisions based upon their respective objectives.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that different rules apply. 4
The notice provision's objective is to inform the insurer of an adverse
claim. Timely notice allows the insurer to adequately investigate and pre-
pare for a defense against the claim.25 Without notice, the insurer would
not have the time to investigate the claim or the information needed to
defend against the claim, activities essential to the duties the insurer as-
sumed under the insurance policy. 6 In short, the notice provision is essen-
involved an insured who gave notice six months after the accident and one month after enter-
ing into a plea agreement in which the insured assumed responsibility for all damages. Id. at
259. Kosanovich involved an accident victim who attempted to garnish an insured's insurance
proceeds and an insurer who had not received prompt notice of the accident. Id. The accident
occurred on September 7, 1979; the insurer learned of the accident over a month later, and
learned of the lawsuit on January 12, 1981, after a default judgment had been taken. Id. at
266. Miller involved a February 2, 1979, accident after which notice was not given until Sep-
tember 5, 1979, when a suit was filed. Id. at 260.
24. Id. at 265. The court of appeals held that cooperation clauses and notice provisions
are alike in that they require the insured to assist the insurer in preparing for trial or settle-
ment. Indiana Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d at 1237; Kosanovich, 449 N.E.2d at 1180 n.3 (citing
Indiana Ins. Co.). (Miller was concerned solely with the notice provision. 453 N.E.2d at 300).
The Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana precedent supported the court of appeals on the
issue of the requirement that the insurer show actual prejudice from an insured's noncompli-
ance with a cooperation clause. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 261-63. Nevertheless, the issue about
whether prejudice was required whenever there was noncompliance with a notice provision had
never been discussed by the Indiana courts. Id. at 262. The Indiana Supreme Court held that
"[flailure to cooperate can come about in many ways, some of which may be technical and
inconsequential, thereby resulting in no prejudice to the insurance company." Id. at 265. No-
tice was, however, a threshold requirement by which the insurer learned that there was a claim
pending under the insurance policy. Id. The basic difference seems to be in timing; notice is a
condition precedent to the cooperation clause. Id. at 264.
25. Miller states that "[t]he requirement of prompt notice gives the insurer an opportu-
nity to make a timely and adequate investigation of all the circumstances surrounding the
accident or loss." Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265. This is supported by the leading insurance trea-
tise writers, who also agree that an adequate investigation is important for several reasons: to
prevent fraud and imposition upon the insurer; to allow the insurer to investigate while wit-
nesses are easily available and memories are fresh; and for estimating rights and liabilities in
order to settle or to defend adequately. 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, §
4731; 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.02; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 49:2. This last reason
has, however, been disputed by some jurisdictions, and in those jurisdictions investigation is the
only reason for prompt notice. See 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 4731 n.5,
at 6 (Appleman and .Appleman list Connecticut, Vermont and West Virginia as jurisdictions
disputing this reason for prompt notice). See also infra note 89 (interrelationship of notice and
prejudice).
26. Miller states that: "The notice requirement is 'material, and of the essence of the
contract.' London Guarantee, supra, 35 Ind. App. at 345, 66 N.E. at 482." Miller, 463
N.E.2d at 265. London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Siwy, 35 Ind. App. 340, 66 N.E. 481
(1903), involved an employer's liability insurance policy that contained a requirement for im-
mediate notification of an employee's claim for an injury). Three months lapsed between the
claim for an injury and notice to the insurer. London Guarantee, 35 Ind. App. at 346, 66 N.E.
at 483. Also, the Miller decision gives the full quotation from which the above quotation was
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tial to the contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court decided that notice
was a condition precedent to the insurer's liability for the claim, and that
the insured had the burden of showing that the insurer was not prejudiced
by the insured's delayed notice.28 When the insured fails to make such a
showing, the presumption of the insurer's prejudice becomes conclusive and
relieves the insurer of its responsibilities under the insurance policy. 9
The Miller decision contains a good analysis of Indiana case law on
delayed notice, but two Seventh Circuit decisions cited in Miller need par-
ticular attention: Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Lochmandy Buick
Sales, Inc.2 and Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson.3 1 These two deci-
sions require particular attention because they were essential to the Indiana
Supreme Court's decision in Miller.2 Lochmandy stated that the general
excerpted at Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 263. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, did not empha-
size the sentence following that from which the above quotation was excerpted. "A failure to
give such notice immediately involves an absolute forfeiture, which cannot be relieved against
in equity." London Guarantee, 35 Ind. App. at 345, 66 N.E. at 482. The obvious conclusion
seems to be that the Indiana courts have retreated from the harshness of strict forfeiture, as
have other courts. See Comment, supra note 9, at 268.
27. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265.
28. Id. That a contract is a conscious decision between the parties is bound in the phrase
"freedom of contract." This freedom to contract reached its highest point in the nineteenth
century, and in the twentieth century legislative restrictions were imposed on employment and
insurance contracts. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 5-6 (1987). There
has also been common law restriction where the bargaining process has been limited, i.e. in
contract by adhesion. Id. at 6. Calamari and Perillo outlined several philosophical foundations
for contract law: a) the sovereignty of the human will; b) the sanctity of promise; c) private
autonomy; d) reliance; and e) needs of trade. Id. at 7-11. For all their differences, each theory
holds that the decision to contract is a conscious decision.
29. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265-66; Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479
N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
30. 302 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962). Lochmandy is particularly important because it intro-
duced a presumption of prejudice for unreasonably delayed notice.
31. 507 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1974).
32. The importance given to Lochmandy and Rynearson is made explicit in Miller:
We give respectful consideration to them [federal court interpretations of Indiana law],
however, as we do to decisions in other jurisdictions to aid us in coming to the ultimate
conclusion of what the law is in Indiana on particular issue. In so doing, we find the
opinions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Lochmandy and Rynearson to be
sound and well grounded in Indiana law.
Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 263.
The importance of Lochmandy and Rynearson was first pointed out in Judge Hoffman's
dissent to Indiana Ins. Co. v. Williams, 448 N.E.2d 1233, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App 1983) (Hoff-
man, J., dissenting). Judge Hoffman's dissent was favorably cited in Miller:
We agree with Judge Hoffman in his dissent to Indiana Insurance in which he found that
notice given ten days after the suit was filed and almost seven months after the accident
occurred "hardly constitut[ed] timely notice." Judge Hoffman further pointed out that
late notice given to an insurer places it in a position that could have been avoided through
timely notice, and that the "most cooperative insured cannot erase this prejudice suffered
by the insurer" in situations where the scene of the accident changes, or witnesses move
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rule for excusing delayed notice is a determination of whether the insured
was acting as a reasonably prudent person.13 Rynearson restated the rule
and found that Indiana law created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
to the insurer.
In Rynearson, the insured was an insurance claims adjustor prior to
the claim and a practicing attorney when the claim arose. Accordingly,
Rynearson was held to a higher standard than the average insured and his
excuse was disallowed.," The Seventh Circuit found that the Indiana prece-
dent basically reinforced the contract law foundation for using the pre-
sumption that notice was a condition precedent to the insurer's performance
under the insurance policy.3 5 The presumption used in Miller is directly
traceable to the Rynearson decision.3 6
The first application of the Miller standard was Milwaukee Guardian
Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart.3 7 In Reichhart, the insured had changed a water-
course on his property so that the water flowed onto a neighbor's property.
The neighbor then sued the insured, and the insured defended against this
suit. 8 The defendant was successful at trial.39 When the claim arose, the
insured did not believe that his policy covered the claim and did not send
notice to the insurer until a neighbor informed him that insurance should
away or have their memories lapse, due to the passage of time. 448 N.E.2d at 1238.
Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265. The Indiana Supreme Court also cited Judge Hoffman in support
of its characterizing notice as a condition precedent: "as Judge Hoffman stated, '[niotice is a
threshold requirement.' " Id. Judge Hoffman seems to have been influential in finding a pur-
pose for the notice provision and in ascertaining its nature as a condition precedent to the
insurer's obligations. It should also be noted that Judge Hoffman wrote the opinion in Milwau-
kee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340 (1985).
33. "The general rule is that an insured will be excused, where, acting as a reasonably
prudent person, he believed he was not liable for the accident." Lochmandy, 302 F.2d at 566.
This rule is repeated in Rynearson, and the Seventh Circuit held that different factual situa-
tions created different fact patterns. Rynearson, 507 F.2d at 579. See infra note 86 for further
discussion on how this rule was applied in Rynearson.
In Lochmandy, the insured was a Buick dealership whose president did not give notice
that a claim had arisen against the dealership. Lochmandy, 302 F.2d at 566. The president
delayed notice of the dealership's liability due to his belief that there was no liability against
the dealership. Id. The court of appeals held that the insured had acted unreasonably in decid-
ing not to fully investigate his liability. Id. at 578.
34. Rynearson, 507 F.2d at 579.
35. The leading Indiana case holding notice as a condition precedent was London Guar-
antee and Accident Co. v. Siwy, 35 Ind. App. 340, 66 N.E. 481 (1903). Other similar Indiana
cases were: Lomont v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 128 Ind. App. 645, 151 N.E.2d 701
(1958); Shedd v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 48 Ind. App. 23, 95 N.E. 316 (1911) (credit insur-
ance); Baker v. German Fire Ins. Co., 124 Ind. 490, 24 N.E. 1041 (1890) (fire insurance). See
supra note 26 for the discussion of how the Miller court treated London Guarantee.
36. Rynearson, 507 F.2d at 579.
37. 479 N.E.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
38. Id. at 1341.
39. Id.
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cover the claim." ° When the insured discovered that coverage was available,
he sent notice to his insurer, eleven months after the trial was completed.4
The insurer denied liability and refused to reimburse Reichhart's legal fees;
Reichhart then sued.42 Since Reichhart had prevailed on the underlying
claim, the trial court held that the insurer was not prejudiced, and therefore
the insured had rebutted the Miller presumption.4s
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and held that
the insurer had been prejudiced as a matter of law."" The court of appeals
reasoned that the insured's successful defense against the claim was not
enough to show that no actual prejudice had resulted to the insurer. The
court noted that the notice was delayed eleven months, that the insured had
been in frequent contact with his insurance agent, and that the insured had
years of experience in dealing with insurance, thus hinting that the delay
was unreasonable.' 6 The court of appeals characterized the prejudice to the
insurer as the inability to choose its own defense counsel, the inability to
guide the course of litigation, and the inability to take part in settlement
negotiations."" In effect, the Reichhart decision increased the burden of
proving that the delay did not actually prejudice the insurer. This decision
40. Id. There was some question as to whether notice was given to Reichhart's insurance
agent. Id. at 1341 n.l. The court of appeals considered that the insured had an opportunity to
consult with his insurance agent and to either discover that notice was due, or to give notice.
Id. However, the communication that did exist between the insured and the insurance agent
did not prevent a delay of the notice to the insurer as required by the insurance policy. Id.
The insurance agent was also discussed in the briefs filed in the Indiana Supreme Court.
The issue was whether the agent knew the policy's coverage. Reichhart testified that the agent
said that Reichhart "would be covered - should be covered under the home owner's policy."
Brief for Defendant-Appellant in Opposition to Petition to Transfer at 9, Reichhart, 479
N.E.2d 1340 (No. 3-1284A349) (emphasis added). Some doubt could exist about how effec-
tive any amount of communication would have been with an agent who equivocates in this
fashion.
41. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d at 1341.
42. Id.
43. id.
44. Id. at 1343.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court of appeals summarized as follows:
An insurance company cannot be forced to pay fees and expense incurred wholly without
its knowledge or consent pursuant to an insurance contract when the insured has made no
effort to fulfill his duties under that contract. . . . The trial court erred in finding that
Milwaukee had not been prejudiced by Reichhart's delay.
Id. The decision could better be explained as a quasi-contract decision. This was the theory
with which the insured sought to recover his attorney's fees from the insurer. Id. Indiana
precedent was held to oppose an award based upon quasi-contract or quantum meruit; the
party seeking to recover on such a basis must show a benefit rendered at the other's express or
implied request. Id. (citing Kody Eng'g Co. v. Fox Ins. Agency, 153 Ind. App. 498, 303
N.E.2d 307 (1973)). However, the holding explicitly states that the prejudice suffered by the
insurer precludes the insured's claim, and prejudice is the keystone of this decision. Reichhart,
479 N.E.2d at 1342.
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is inequitable and is hard to reconcile with decisions from similar jurisdic-
tions involving similar facts.
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Phelps,47 for example, the
Florida Court of Appeals applied the same rule used by the Indiana Su-
preme Court to find that delayed notice did not prejudice the insurer."8 In
Phelps, the insureds' delayed notice of damage done to their bursting pipe
resulted in the insurer denying liability on two theories: that an exclusion-
ary provision covered the occurrence, and that the insureds failed to give
timely notice.49 The insureds claimed that they were unaware of the policy
coverage and hence gave an untimely notice of the injury.60 The Florida
Court of Appeals found two elements persuasive in its conclusion that the
insureds had rebutted the presumption of prejudice: notice was given as
soon as possible, and the insurer would probably have denied liability even
if notice was timely.5'
Reichhart is also difficult to reconcile with an Illinois Appellate Court
decision, Farmer's Automobile Insurance Association v. Hamilton,52 where
no prejudice was found in a one-year delay of notice to the insurer.53 The
insured shot a man at the insured's home and criminal proceedings against
the insured followed. 5' One year after the shooting, the victim began a civil
suit against the insured, and the insured gave notice to his insurer upon
receiving notice of the civil suit.55 The insurer argued that notice was due at
the time of the criminal proceedings. The Illinois Appellate Court, in excus-
ing the delay provision, held that the delay came within the reasonably pru-
dent person exception in which the insured acted as a reasonably prudent
person in not believing that notice was due.56 Facts pertinent to the appel-
late court's decision were the insured's ignorance of a duty to notify his
insurer of the occurrence, the insured's ignorance of the fact that the policy
covered the occurrence, and the fact that notice was quickly given when a
civil suit was initiated against the insured.
57
A more difficult reconcillation with the Reichhart decision is the Mil-
47. 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (involved a bursting water pipe and an
"all-risks" homeowners policy).
48. Id. at 365.
49, Id. at 363. The Florida Court of Appeals does not mention how long notice was
delayed.
50. Id. at 365.
51. id.
52. 31 II1. App. 3d 730, 335 N.E.2d 178 (1975).
53. Id. at 731, 335 N.E.2d at 179.
54. Id. at 733, 335 N.E.2d at 181.
55. Id. at 731, 335 N.E.2d at 179.
56. Id. at 732-33, 335 N.E.2d at 180.
57. Id. at 733-34, 335 N.E.2d at 180-81.
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waukee Mutual Insurance Co. v. Butler decision.58 In Butler, the District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that the Miller rule is met
when the insured shows that the insurer could not have taken any more
action than was taken, even if the notice had been timely.59 The district
court found that the insurance policy was vague as to the time limits for
giving notice to the insurer." More important were the facts that the in-
surer conducted no investigation until a year after the notice had been re-
ceived and that the police had conducted their own investigation. These two
facts show that the late notice had not injured the insurer any more than
timely notice would have benefitted the insurer.61 These three decisions, and
particularly Butler, are hard to reconcile with Reichhart and bring into
question the correctness of the Reichhart decision and the presumption of
prejudice.
As was shown above, the Reichhart decision is a result outside the
range of similar decisions applying the same rule. The real problem with
Reichhart is the rule itself and how the rule was applied. The problem is
caused by the underlying rationale for the rule, the concept of prejudice
used by the courts in analyzing the notice provision, and the effect of delay
on the insurer's obligation under the insurance policy. An examination of
how the analysis of other courts approach the delayed notice issue will re-
veal the pitfalls of using a presumption of prejudice rule.
III. THE THREE RULES FOR EVALUATING WHETHER TO EXCUSE A
DELAYED NOTICE
The decisions regarding delayed notice illustrate three rules.62 These
rules are: 1) that notice is a contract provision which is breached by delay
58. 615 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ind. 1985). This case also involved delayed notice under an
automobile insurance policy.
59. Id. at 494. The accident occurred on October 28, 1979, and the insurer was given
notice on June 24, 1980, with addtional telephonic notice given on July 1, 1980. Id. at 492-93.
There is a similarity between Phelps and Butler in that both find that action by the insurer
would not have been different even if notice had been timely. Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Butler, 615 F. Supp. at 494.
60. Butler, 615 F. Supp. at 494. The ambiguity found in Butler between page three of
the policy (a hit and run accident needed reporting to the police within 24 hours and a sworn
statement to the insurer within thirty days) and page four of the policy (twenty days for giving
notice to the insurer unless not reasonably possible) is found in Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257
(Ind. 1984). Miller states quite specifically that the policies in question had no ambiguity. Id.
at 265.
61. 615 F. Supp. at 494. The insurance policy required that the insured notify the police
of a hit-and-run accident. The Indianapolis Police Department and the Marion County Sher-
iff's Department conducted a "thorough investigation" but did not find the driver. On the
other hand, Milwaukee Mutuals' claims manager opened a file upon receiving notice, but did
not begin to investigate the claim until one year after receiving notice. Id.
62. See Annotation, supra note 8, at 146-52.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1988], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss2/7
19881 PRESUMED PREJUDICE
and the non-breaching party is excused from performance;"3 2) that notice
is a condition precedent to performance by the insurer in which a delay in
notice creates a presumption against the insured that the insurer was
prejudiced by such delay; 4 and 3) that the delay is not excused if the in-
sured acted unreasonably and prejudice is an element in determining the
reasonableness of the insured's actions. 65
The underlying rationale for applying a particular rule6 6 depends on
the contract theory used in interpreting insurance policies.6 7 Those jurisdic-
tions adhering to the strict contract rule consider an insurance contract to
be a bilateral contract.6" Hence, the insured, as the breaching party due to
his delayed notice, cannot demand performance from the non-breaching
party, the insurer.69
The strict contract approach is modified by those jurisdictions that use
the presumption of prejudice and reasonableness-of-the-delay rules. Those
adhering to the presumption of prejudice rule have retained the concept of
63. Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ind. 1984). "A strict contractual interpreta-
tion of the provision to give notice 'as soon as practicable' results in construction of the notice
clause as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability under the policy." Comment, supra
note 9, at 261. The insurer will not be relieved of liability if the trier of fact finds that the
insured has not complied with the notice provision. Id. Prejudice is immaterial.
64. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an example. The Indiana Supreme
Court adopted this rule in Miller, 63 N.E.2d 257. See also supra note 10.
65. See Comment, supra note 9, at 268. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Burgess, 474 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 1985) (reasonableness of the delay measured by the reasons for
the delay, the length thereof, and if insurer was prejudiced); Cooper v. Gov't Employees Ins.
Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) (similar to Burgess, but adds good faith requirement for
insured); and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769
(1981) (adopting Cooper test).
Prejudice is a question of fact which must be left to the trier of fact. See Wendell v.
Swanberg, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d 348 (1971); Comment, supra note 9, at 267.
66. This note takes a normative approach to examining this aspect of insurance. That is,
this note does not try to explain why a certain rationale is chosen. While a study into why a
certain rationale is chosen could be undertaken, any such examination is outside the scope of
this note and is of little practicality in regards to the problem of prejudice and timely notice.
67. See Comment, supra note 9, at 261-62; Annotation, supra note 8, at 146.
68. See supra note 66.
69. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court also reviewed cases in Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d
257 (Ind. 1984), which supported each theory: Waters v. Am. Automotive Ins. Co., 363 F.2d
684 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (eight month delay in giving notice breached condition precedent lan-
guage of policy and insurer did not need to establish prejudice); Richmond v. Georgia Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 215, 231 S.E.2d 245 (1976) (notice is a condition prece-
dent and insurer need not show prejudice); Diese v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 205
So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (insurer need not show prejudice but party seeking to
impose liability must show a lack of prejudice); and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 N.J.
Super. 142, 230 A.2d 179 (1967) (the lack of prejudice considered in determining reasonable-
ness of time). Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 264-65.
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notice as a condition precedent to the insurer's performance.70 The courts
adhering to the third rule have modified the contractual approach further
by recognizing the adhesive nature of insurance policies and the social pol-
icy served by insurance.7 1 However, none of the jurisdictions that employ
the presumption of prejudice and reasonableness-of-the-delay rules have
abandoned the concept of insurance as a contract. Rather, these jurisdic-
tions recognize that there is a relationship between the parties in which the
insurer has more power to protect its interests."
One commentator has noted that a judicial preference exists for the
insurer.7 The Reichhart decision shows that this preference is useless with-
out guidelines on how the insured is to prove no prejudice. Notice is essen-
tial to the insurance contract because without notice the insurer cannot
know that the time has come to perform his duties.74 Yet, the rebuttable
presumption creates a difficult evidentiary problem for the insured. The in-
sured usually has neither the access to proof on how the insurer was
prejudiced, nor the ability to disprove prejudice.7' This evidentiary problem
70. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265, is an example of this second rule.
71. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated the matter thusly: "[tihe insurance con-
tract not being a truly consensual arrangement and being available only on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. [sic] and the subject being in essence a matter of forfeiture."
Cooper v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237 A.2d 870, 874 (1968). The New
Jersey Supreme Court described the purpose of insurance as "an instrument of a social policy
that the victims of negligence be compensated," Id. See also Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance
Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 625 INs. L.J. 71, 77 (1975) (the effect of using
adhesion contract theories to interpret insurance policies). Young, Lewis, and Lee contend that
if contract law is not the basis of insurance disputes, as is the case where adhesion contracts
are judged according to social policies, then guidelines "other than the courts unfettered notion
of what is just in a given situation" are needed. Id. The authors suggest a doctrine similar to
the Uniform Commercial Code's "unconscionability" doctrine. Id. at 77-78.
72. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 900.
73. Williston gives a detailed accounting of judicial preference for insureds:
The fundamental reason which explains this and other examples of judicial predisposition
toward the insured is the deep-seated, often unconscious but justified feeling or belief that
the powerful underwriter, having drafted its several types of insurance 'contracts of adhe-
sion' with the aid of skillful and highly paid legal talent, from which no deviation desired
by an applicant will be permitted, is almost certain to overreach the other party to the
contract. The established underwriter is magnificently qualified to understand and protect
its own selfish interests.
7 WIuISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 900, at 19. The judicial preference for insureds
is borne out in the number and variety of categories used in Annotation, supra note 8, for the
delayed notice issue: the view that the insurer need not show prejudice (broad view: lack of
mutuality; qualified view: rebuttable presumption of prejudice); the view that prejudice is a
factor in determining the unreasonableness of the delay itself; and the view that the insurer
must show prejudice (generally, with exceptions and statutory requirement). Id. at 146-49.
74. See infra note 107.
75. See infra note 149, concerning access to proof as a factor when creating an eviden-
tiary presumption. As to the difficulty of disproving prejudice:
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the
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can unintentionally frustrate the insured's reasonable expectations of insur-
ance coverage.76 Hence, such problems in evidence impose a great burden
on the insured and permits a preferential edge to the insurer.
Both the insurer's and the insured's interests are better protected by
the reasonableness-of-the-delay rule. This rule concerns itself with the rea-
sonableness of the delay.7" An argument can be made that reasonableness is
also at the root of the presumption of prejudice rule'78 for prejudice is less
likely to occur when the insured has acted reasonably.7 9 Nevertheless, the
insured's ability to rebut the presumption of prejudice has overshadowed
any reasonableness aspect originally included in the rule.
One recurring factor in delayed notice cases is that vague insurance
policy provisions often cause the delay.80 Thus, the courts favoring the rea-
sonableness-of-the-delay rule combine a dislike of forfeiture of insurance
same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the
foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply
a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if
ever so conformable to reality. . . .Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a con-
tradiction and be never distinctly conceived by the mind.
D. HUME, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in THE EMPIRICIsTS 307, 223-33
(1961).
76. The reasonable expectation of the insured as used here is derived from Young, Lewis
& Lee, supra note 71, at 78. These authors describe a species of reasonable expectations as
being an entitlement to all the coverage under an insurance policy which the insured can rea-
sonably expect, and in which coverage is not specifically foreclosed by a policy provision.
77. The reasonableness-of-the-delay rule does have one fault: an insured may have acted
reasonably, and still the insurer is not liable due to prejudice from the delay. See Cooper v.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237 A.2d 870, 873 (1968).
78. The general rule that a delay is excused where the insured acted as a reasonably
prudent person was stated in Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Lochmandy Buick Sales,
302 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962) and reiterated in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d
573 (7th Cir. 1974), and Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984). See also supra note 33.
In fact, the presumption of prejudice arises when the notice is unreasonably late. Miller, 463
N.E.2d at 263. Therefore, reasonableness forms the basis of the presumption of prejudice rule.
79. But see Cooper, 51 N.J. at 94, 237 A.2d at 874.
80. Vague insurance policies are a common factor in Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v.
Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v.
Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Hamilton, 31
Ill. App. 3d 730, 335 N.E.2d 178 (1975), and Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 615 F.
Supp. 491 (S.D. Ind. 1985). In Reichhart, there was a doubt about coverage. 479 N.E.2d at
1342. This doubt seems to have been shared by Reichhart's insurance agent. See supra note
40. Likewise, the insureds in Phelps, 294 So. 2d at 365, and Hamilton, 335 N.E.2d at 181,
were not aware that policy coverage existed in the specific instances at issue in their cases.
American Jurisprudence 2d states the general rule for this type of case as follows: "[ain
insured may be excused for a delay or failure to give the required notice were it appeared that
he believed, acting as a reasonably prudent person, that the accident or injury was not covered
by the liability policy." 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1343, at 272 (1982).
Only Butler involved an ambiguity between notice provisions. 615 F. Supp. at 494. In this
situation, the ambiguity is to be resolved against the insurer. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265.
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policies and an adhesion contract approach.8 ' The insurer writes the policy
provisions, and is released from liability if the insured cannot rebut the pre-
sumption of prejudice rule. As a result, the insured loses the protection
from liability paid in premiums.8" Under the reasonableness-of-the-delay
rule the insured loses his premiums only when the following conditions have
been met: when the insured has acted unreasonably, the delay injures the
insurer's interests, and no fault can be attributed to the insurer.
8 3
The reasonableness-of-the-delay rule is a better analysis of the rela-
tionship between the insured and the insurer and a proper balancing of the
parties' interests. This relationship is that of an adhesion contract,84 with
the insurer as the superior party in the relationship. 85 By making reasona-
bleness the essential feature of this rule,8" the courts have shifted the bal-
ance of power within the relationship of insurer and insured. However, this
rule does not strip the insurer of all protection because prejudice is kept as
an element in determining the overall reasonableness of the delay.8 7
81. See generally supra note 71.
82. Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 71, at 74-75 (discusses the theory of adhesion
contracts, the commercial uses of adhesion contracts, and their particular application to insur-
ance policies).
83. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co. 303 N.C. 387, 396, 279 S.E.2d
769, 774 (1981).
84. See infra notes 120-38.
85. Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 71, at 74-75; 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra
note I, § 900.
86. To return to the Indiana cases: there does not seem to be any derivation between the
knowledge of the insured in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d 573 (7th Cir.
1974), and Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 F.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985),
on the subject of insurance. However, the insured in Rynearson had been an insurance claims
adjustor prior to the time that the claim arose and was a practicing attorney when the claim
arose; because of this the court of appeals said he "possessed knowledge of insurance contracts
far superior to that of the average insured." Rynearson, 507 F.2d at 578. This description
needs to be contrasted with the Indiana Court of Appeals' description of the insured in
Reichhart:
Reichhart was knowledgeable in matters of insurance and had carried Milwaukee Guard-
ian Insurance, both personal and business, through the Wegmann agency for twenty
years. He and his family had submitted various claims for insurance prior to the Ken-
neeck suit. Reichhart testified that Wegmann was an accessible insurance agent and
Reichhart was normally in contact with Wegmann every two or three months.
Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d at 1342.
There is a difference here. Reichhart is certainly what Rynearson was not: an average insured.
Since the insured's knowledge is part of the reasonableness standard of Rynearson, the in-
sured's knowledge must be ascertained clearly. Rynearson, 507 F.2d at 579. The Reichhart
decision does not seem to have ascertained what specific knowledge the insured had about
insurance, and hence, the reasonableness of the insured's actions.
87. See infra notes 88-104 for a discussion of the concept of prejudice. See also Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981) for an example
of a court adopting the third rule and how that court views prejudice.
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IV. THE CONCEPT OF PREJUDICE
Prejudice is an elusive element and a difficult concept to prove.88 The
courts have not defined prejudice, but have functionally used it in relation
to the purpose of notice.8 ' Thus, prejudice occurs when the insurer cannot
protect its interests under an insurance policy.10 These interests would be
harmed when the insurer is unable to investigate a claim adequately in
preparation for trial or settlement,9'1 when the insurer would be unable to
detect fraudulent claims, 9 or when the insurer would be unable to litigate a
claim as effectively as it would have been able to if notice was timely.93
However, one court defined and limited prejudice to those situations where
the delay causes the insurer to assume liabilities which the insurer did not
assume under the insurance policy.94
Defining prejudice in this way is reasonable when the basis of the in-
88. See 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 4732, at 26.
89. The North Carolina Supreme Court was succinct in its description of the interrela-
tionship of notice and prejudice:
The clear purpose of the notice provision is to protect the ability of the insurer to prepare
a viable defense by preserving its ability fully to investigate the accident. It follows, then,
that if the delay in giving notice has not materially prejudiced the ability of the insurer to
defend the claim, its obligations under the insurance contract should not be excused.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 397, 279 S.E.2d 769, 775 (1981).
The Indiana Supreme Court made a similar, but narrower statement in Miller v. Dilts, 463
N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984), when it described the effects of delayed notice. 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind.
1984). See also supra note 25.
The Miller decision relates notice to investigation of a claim. Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265.
This is to be contrasted with the Reichhart decision where the interests prejudiced by delayed
notice may be best described as a litigation interest: the insurer did not select the insured,
negotiate attorney's fees, guide the litigation, or participate in settlement negotiations.
Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d at 1343. Instead, the Reichhart decision's use of the litigation context
instead of the investigation interest as the area being prejudiced seems more akin to the ration-
ale used in Indiana Ins. Co. v. Williams, 448 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), and
Kosavonich v. Meade, 449 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), for treating notice provi-
sions and cooperation clauses as the same. Miller specifically disapproved of this view; that
decision made clear the distinction between cooperation clauses and notice provisions. 463
N.E.2d at 265.
90. Notice serves the purpose of alerting the insurer to possible claims, and giving the
insurer time to investigate those claims in order to prepare an adequate defense and thwart
fraudulent claims. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.02, at 13-16. Without timely notice the
insurer may be unable to have sufficient time to investigate. See also Tate, 303 N.C. at 397,
279 S.E.2d at 775.
91. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.02, at 13-16; and 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 15, § 4731, at 2-4.
92. See 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.02, at 13-16.
93. See generally supra note 25.
94. "Because it takes prejudice into account, the new rule does not affect the ability of
the insurer to investigate and defend. Thus, the risk undertaken by the insurer remains un-
changed." Tate, 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774 (emphasis in the original).
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surance industry is considered. The insurance business is based upon what
the insurer considers to be an acceptable risk as determined by actuarial
tables." The insurer does not accept all risks, the insurer accepts only those
risks whose probability of occurring is low enough to make assuming liabil-
ity for that risk profitable." The probability of a risk occurring is incorpo-
rated into the insurance policy, and helps to determine whether an insur-
ance policy should be given to the applicant. 97 Timely notice may also
permit a prompt settlement which relieves the insurer of litigation costs."
Therefore, the insurer's business is not to assume liability for any and all
risks, and timely notice is critical for the insurer to assume liability only for
those risks that will provide a profit.99
The importance of the above formulation of prejudice is apparent when
we examine the insurance industry's method of calculating its risks. The
insurer runs his business in regard to calculated risk.100 Imposing an un-
calculated risk on the insurer will cause it to suffer unprepared losses and
95. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 133.
96. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 6 (6th ed. 1976).
97. An ideal rate allows the insurer exactly enough income to meet insurance losses
and expenses attributable to each large group of risks of the same quality, and also provides
the insurer with a reasonable margin. A. MOWBRAY & R. BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 372 (5th
ed. 1961). However, this is an ideal rate; reality interjects less certainty. "What is done in a
particular line of insurance depends on the attitude of the insurers, policies of state insurance
departments, available data, and the state of actuarial science in that line." Id. Nevertheless,
risk is not excluded from an insurer's calculation, but instead there is a difference in the accu-
racy of the rates. Id.
98. In addition, prompt notice for a liability insurance policy can aid in settlement
negotiations. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 97, at 252.
99. Liability is assumed only where a profit is possible. See A. MOWBRAY & R.
BLANCHARD, supra note 97. Mehr and Cammach substantially agree with Mowbray and
Blanchard:
The adequacy of a rate is determined by comparing the actual loss ratio with the one
assumed in computing the rate. The 'assumed loss ratio' is the estimated percentage of
the total earned premium needed to pay incurred losses, including loss-adjustment ex-
penses. The remainder is available for operating expenses, taxes and profits.
R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 601. Earned premiums are the premiums allo-
cated to the one year period that insurance coverage exists, and are to be differentiated from
written premiums. Written premiums include all the premiums collected during the same pe-
riod. Incurred losses include losses paid, those incurred but not yet reported, those reported but
not yet paid, and any other losses incurred in the twelve month period; paid losses are those
losses that are disbursed during the same time period. Id.
100. "The success of a cooperative plan such as insurance requires as equitable a distri-
bution of costs among participants as possible. Maintaining a semblance of equity among poli-
cyholders is the job of the underwriter, who must classify and rate each loss exposure." R.
MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 6. Complete equity is impossible as this would re-
quire that no two insureds be treated the same, and thus wreck the principle of total loss
values through large numbers of homogeneous loss units. Id. at 602. Thus, that the insurance
business is a calculated risk business should be adequately demonstrated. See also supra notes
97 and 99.
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the result will be financially embarrassing to an insurer unable to cover its
losses. 10' A financially embarrassed insurer will be unable to perform the
socially beneficial task of spreading risk.' Eventually, the loss will fall
upon those who will be unable to obtain the services of an insurer, namely,
those unable to pay the increased premiums the insurer requires for cover-
ing the uncalculated losses. This result is as undesirable as releasing the
insurer from liability under the strict contract rule and leaving the insured
to bear the liability alone.
Defining prejudice as the insurer assuming uncalculated liabilities also
illuminates the insured's difficulty in proving prejudice. It is the insurer who
knows how much its interests have been affected by the delayed notice, for
the insurer has already calculated what the risk to those interests are.10 a
The insurer, not the insured, has access to the information regarding how
these calculations have been altered, and the insurer's access to this infor-
mation eases the insurer's task of proving prejudice. Thus, the reasonable-
ness-of-the-delay rule places the burden of rebuttal on the wrong party. The
third rule makes prejudice more analogous to an affirmative defense upon
the part of the insurer by using prejudice as an element in determining the
delay's reasonableness.' Because the insurer has better access than the
insured to the information concerning prejudice, it seems logical that the
reasonableness-of-the-delay rule, which requires the insurer to prove
prejudice, offers a more desirable approach.
V. THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE
The proper conception of notice is the crux of the problem in delayed
notice cases. Notice is how the insurer learns that a claim has arisen under
the insurance policy. 06 The courts consider a lack of notice prejudicial to
the insurer's interests.'" The common conception of notice is that notice is
a condition precedent to the insurer's obligations under the insurance pol-
icy; if the insured does not give notice the contractual condition is not satis-
101. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 397, 279 S.E.2d
769, 775 (1981); Comment, supra note 9, at 268.
105. See supra notes 1-2.
106. A look to the purpose of notice that has been assigned by the courts and commen-
tators, the ability to investigate a claim, shows that the amount of prejudice is equivalent to
the amount of time that notice is delayed. Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Ind. 1984), 2
R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.02, at 13-16; 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, §
4731, at 2; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 49:2, at 227; R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra
note 96, at 252. This is particularly true with liability insurance that has been described as
"defense insurance." R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 252.
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fled and the insurer need not perform.10 7 This conception of notice as a
condition precedent does not address realities underlying notice, namely,
whether the insured had the requisite knowledge that the policy required
notice of an event.10 8 The better conception of notice recognizes that for
notice to exist, the insured must know that an event is covered by the insur-
ance policy and that notice is to be given for this event.
The distinction must be made between notice as knowledge and notice
as notification.109 Notice can be divided into two major subdivisions of cog-
nitive notice and absolute notice."10 Knowledge exists when one is aware of
107. Generally, the insurer has no other means of acquiring knowledge that an event has
occurred which leads to a claim against the insurer, other than notice from the insured. For
this reason the courts have considered notice to be a condition precedent to the insurer's liabil-
ity for the claim. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.03, at 13-8 to -11. Notice may be given by
one other than the insured (this may be the victim) for the insured's benefit, but only the
insured is contractually obligated to give notice. Id., § 13.06, at 13-28. It should be noted that
notice is important and necessary for both insured and insurer. The insured wishes the insurer
to defend claims against the insured, and prompt notice will lead to a better defense than
delayed notice. See Tate, 303 N.C. at 397, 279 S.E.2d at 775. This note is concerned with is a
more practicable standard for reviewing delayed notice, one which preserves all interests to the
insurance policy.
108. Consideration must be given to the type of policy that is involved in each factual
situation. Each line of insurance - life, marine, inland marine, automobile, worker's compen-
sation, and liability - have their rates made in a different manner. A. MOWBRAY & R.
BLANCHARD, supra note 97, at 383-91. There is also a difference in the legislative treatment of
the different types of insurance. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 381 Mass. 278, 409
N.E.2d 185 (1980) (changed the rule for delayed notice in cases that are not covered by a
statute that applies only to motor vehicle liability coverage). In Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
Hamilton, 31 11. App. 3d 730, 734, 335 N.E.2d 178, 181 (1975), the Illinois Appellate Court
recognized in dicta that a homeowner's policy is more difficult than an automobile policy. Nor
is the classifying of all liability as defense insurance to be taken as opposing this requirement
for considering the specific insurance policy. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96.
Such classifying goes only to the purpose of the policy; the requirement proposed here goes to
the language of the policy, the methods used in rate-making for the policy, and to the expecta-
tions of the parties. See also Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362, 365
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 615 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.
Ind. 1985).
109. The generic sense of notice includes all forms of knowledge or the equivalent of
knowledge, but judicial interpretation of statutory or other language has frequently interpreted
notice to be synonymous with notification, excluding knowledge or inquiry. I M. MERRILL,
MERRILL ON NOTICE § 12 (1952). This sort of judicial interpretation has led to a distinction
between knowledge and notice. Id. "What is usually meant is that knowledge is but one form
of notice and hence [the] want of knowledge does not preclude notice in some other way ...
Ordinarily we should expect to find the term notice used in its generic sense." Id. § 2, at 2.
110. "The term cognitive notice, as employed herein, is used to denote those situations in
which notice is dependent on the noticee's awareness, at the time the notice is to be effective,
of the facts constituting it." Id. § 3, at 3. Cognitive notice does not require forgotten facts for
notice, nor is knowledge gained from investigation required unless there is a duty to inquire.
Id. Merrill considers knowledge to be a narrower term than notice: "Usually, it does not in-
clude that cognitive notice arising out of the knowledge of matters sufficient to arouse inquiry
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a fact's existence;"' absolute notice includes notification, unforgettable
knowledge and facts which one is required to know."' In the insurance con-
text, the insured is required, as is any party to a contract, to know the
contents of the insurance policy. This requirement would seem to place no-
tice to the insurer in the absolute notice category."1 Yet, a distinction must
be made between reading an insurance policy and understanding the mean-
ing of the policy's provisions. As long as the insured is the party that has
the responsibility and ability for detecting and reporting events that will
give rise to a claim under the insurance policy, the insured must know the
concerning the existence of the ultimate facts with notice of which one is to be charged." Id. §
4, at 4.
"Absolute notice is that notice the effectiveness of which is not dependent upon the
noticee's continued awareness of the matters out of which it arises." Id. § 7, at 5. Included
under absolute notice are notification, unforgettable knowledge, and facts which one is under a
duty to know. Id. § 2, at 2. Merrill gives as examples of absolute notice a recorded instrument
or a published notification which is not seen. Id. § 7, at 5.
111. In the insurance context, the insured being charged with giving notice of an event
which will give rise to liability is the party who must know that liability exists. The insured
must know the policy's coverage before he can give notice. This rationale is implicit in Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d 573, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1974), where the Seventh
Circuit held that an insured who had been a claims adjustor and was an attorney was to be
held to a higher standard. Id.
Notification is notice for performing an act which the law finds sufficient for notice; it is
the act and not the awareness of the act which is important. 1 M. MERRILL, supra note 109, §
8, at 5. Unforgettable knowledge occurs when knowledge is gained and the law requires such
knowledge be retained; once gained, the knowledge is considered to have created notice. Id. §
9, at 7.
What facts which one is under a duty to know depends upon the particular field of law at
issue. Id. § 10, at 7. Ordinarily there is no such duty to possess knowledge. Id. § 472, at 437.
A duty may be imposed when there is the means to secure knowledge plus there exists a
danger of harming another, or the duty is imposed by contract, custom, or statute. Id. §§ 473-
77, at 437-77. Because the insurer writes the insurance policy and it includes technical lan-
guage, the insured will be in a difficult position if he is required to know facts which are not
easily ascertainable under the policy. This problem is increased by having occurrence defined
from the insurer's viewpoint. See Rynearson, supra note 2, at 521-24.
112. This knowledge may appear to fall within the presumption that the insured has
read the insurance policy. See 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 906B, at 300;
Comment, supra note 14, at 579; and Case Note, Insurance - Charging the Insured with
Notice of the Contents of the Policy, 30 TEX. L. REV. 634 (1952) (criticism of the judicial
presumption that the insured has read the insurance as being unrealistic).
113. Asking the insured to be fully knowledgeable about a policy's coverage is unrealis-
tic as the insurer may not be fully knowledgeable about the policy's coverage. The plaintiff's
insurance agent in Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1348 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985), was not absolutely certain that coverage existed. See Brief for Defendant-Appel-
lant, supra note 40. Reichhart's insurance agent is a minor example compared with the
problems Washington insurers faced with plain English policies and proximate cause; the re-
sult seems to have been confusion. See Comment, supra note 14, at 574-77, 582. If an insurer
with all the technical and legal resources available to it is not able to meet these problems,
then the insured will find the task impossible.
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events that are covered by the insurance policy." 4 This is particularly perti-
nent when a common factor in delayed notice cases involves vague policy
provisions.115
The first step that the courts must take in overcoming the notice prob-
lem is to recognize the insurance policy as an adhesion contract." 6 The
insurer is the writer of the insurance policy and thus controls both the con-
tent and the wording of the policy's provisions.' 17 The insurer dictates the
policy's terms to the insured.' 8 The insured should not be presumed to have
knowledge of the policy's provisions in the same manner as a party to a
bargained contract. Since the insured should not be presumed to have such
knowledge, the insured's notice requirement should not be placed in the
category of absolute notice. 9 Futhermore, if we recognize the insurance
policy as an adhesion contract, the insurer has the power to control and
prevent delayed notice with its control of the policy's language. Such power
114. What constitutes an occurrence is defined from the insurer's viewpoint; the insured
needs the ability to recognize a coverable event. See Rynearson, supra note 2, at 521-24.
115. See, for example: Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Hamilton, 31 II1. App. 3d 730, 335
N.E.2d 178 (1975); Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985).
116. A contract of adhesion is one where the seller or manufacturer presents a standard
form which the other party has no choice other than to accept or reject. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 28, at 6. See also infra note 118.
117. "[Tlhe insurance contract usually is a contract of adhesion. The agreement gener-
ally is prepared by lawyers and other representatives of the insurer, or perhaps by representa-
tives of the state regulatory bodies and offered to the prospective insured on a 'take it or leave
it' basis." R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 162. See also infra note 118. In Indi-
ana, a statute provides mandatory policy provisions, but no actual writing is done by a state
agency.
118. Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 71, at 74, note that:
Generally, [the insured] does not propose or draft a single clause or phrase in the policy.
He accepts that which has been written by the company or nothing at all. There is a
likelihood, in fact, that the insured will not see the document evidencing his "agreement"
until after he has paid his first premium.
An overwhelmingly important aspect of an adhesion contract is that the drafting party has the
superior bargaining power over the non-drafting party. See Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 (1964).
119. See Cooper v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237 A.2d 870, 874 (1968).
Also, the insured should not be presumed to have the same general knowledge about insurance
as the insurer. A distinction must be made between what the insured and insurer know about
insurance; this distinction is analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code's implied distinctions
between merchant and non-merchant. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (1978). The insurer fits the Uni-
form Commercial Code's definition of a merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skills peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction." Id. Applying this concept to the insurance
context would mean that the insurer is to be held to a higher standard of knowledge than the
insured, unless the insurer transmits such knowledge to the insured. Otherwise, the insured
should not be presumed to have the same general knowledge about insurance as the insurer.
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will be worthless where the court presumes that the insured understood the
policy, even though the insured does not understand the policy.
VI. THE INSURANCE POLICY AS AN ADHESION CONTRACT
The classic contract consists of two parties bargaining at arms' length
whose final agreement is embodied in the contract. 120 The contracting par-
ties are able to impose their own goals and protect their own interests
through the bargaining process. 121 The process requires that the parties pos-
sess equal bargaining positions; where the parties do not have equal bar-
gaining positions, an adhesion contract exists. 22 The adhesion contract was
so named because the weaker party had to adhere to the stronger party's
terms. 12 The adhesion contract is most commonly embodied in the form
contract.'"
Recall that the insurance policy is an adhesion contract.'25 There is no
equality in the parties' bargaining power. The policy is dictated by the in-
surer, and, in short, the only choice left to the insured is to decide which
insurer will receive his business.' 26 The courts have recognized the unequal
power between the insurer and insured, and have attempted to balance the
parties' positions. 27 The courts' preference for the insured is in part tracea-
ble to the preference given to the traditional contract between two equal
120. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 28, at 6.
121. "True freedom of contract only exits where the contract manifests two ingredients:
the freedom to enter into the contract and the freedom to influence the terms of that contract.
In truth, the average insured possesses none of the latter type of freedom and very little of the
former." Trakman, Adhesion Contracts and the Law of Insurance, 13 MAN. L.J. 23, 24
(1983).
122. Id. See also Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 397, 279
S.E.2d 769, 775 (1981); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 632 (1943). Trakman continues:
The insurance company dictates the terms of the contract, to these the insured must
adhere. There is no real bargaining over contract clauses, there is no serious haggling
over terms. From the insurance companies perspective, the entire arrangement is prede-
termined. For the insured, terms contained in liability exclusion or limitation clauses are
standardized penalties encountered in meeting a very definite, and almost irreversible,
need for insurance.
Trakman, supra note 121, at 24.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Patterson, supra note 118, at 857.
126. Premising the concept of an insurance policy as an adhesion contract, the insurer is
the more powerful of the parties to the insurance policy. The insurer has the power to correct
the wording of the policy and the power to correct is also the power to prevent. Hence, the
insurer should take upon itself the task of avoiding vague policy provisions. See Trakman,
supra note 121, at 24; 7 WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 900.
127. See generally supra note 73.
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parties bargaining for a mutually acceptable agreement.12 8 The courts'
treatment of delayed notice is also influenced by the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts.12 9 Although courts recognize the adhesive nature of in-
surance contracts, they have failed to recognize that the insurer controls the
policy's language, the vagueness of which is a common cause for delayed
notice. 30
The courts use public policy for interposing themselves into adhesion
contract situations. The courts that have dealt with delayed notice in an
adhesion contract context have been principally concerned with the social
policies represented by insurance and the forfeiture of insurance coverage
caused by a reasonably delayed notice.1 ' The social policies served by in-
surance include optimum allocation of resources, acquisition of knowledge
about causes for losses, indemnification for losses, and being a resource for
credit.' 32 However, the most important social policy insurance serves is as a
device for voluntary resource redistribution."3 Insurance spreads the risk of
injuries and their subsequent costs among a wide group. This risk spreading
function is important to the courts and they have gone beyond the limita-
tions of a strict contractual approach.134 The alternative is to leave the risk
of injury upon one person, and this alternative is becoming more unaccept-
able as the costs of paying for injuries continues to increase beyond a single
person's ability to pay.
Courts have further protected the insured, and the risk spreading func-
tion, by disfavoring forfeitures of insurance coverage, unless no other alter-
native exists.1 35 The courts' dislike of forfeiture has led to differences in
how delayed notice is treated. The jurisdictions adhering to the strict con-
tract approach find only a contract at issue. Those jurisdictions using the
prejudice concept find more than a mere contract at issue, these courts rec-
ognize the need to protect the social policy served by insurance. Courts pro-
tect the social policy behind insurance by recognizing that the insurance
policy is an adhesion contract in which the insurer has the controlling
power. The courts act upon this fact by favoring the insured.
The insurer's superiority over the insured should be explicitly recog-
nized in connection with the insurance policy's provisions.' 6 The insurer's
128. Id.; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 28, at 6-11 (philosophy of
contract law centers around individuals).
129. See supra note 8.
130. See supra note 80.
131. See supra note 71.
132. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 11.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 11, 71 and accompanying text.
135. See Comment, supra note 9, at 266.
136. The insured has imputed knowledge of the insurance policy. See 44 AM. JuR. 2D
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superior bargaining position enables the insurer to cheaply and efficiently
mass market insurance. The policy is then written in accordance with actu-
arial tables which present the average risks that the insurer must avoid to
make a profit on the policy. It is the insurer who has the superior bargain-
ing position, and so the insurer has control over what the policy provides
and how the policy's provisions are written. Vague policy provisions clearly
contribute to the insured's delay of notice.1 37 Thus, courts should recognize
the relationship between the insurer's control of policy provisions and the
vagueness of those same provisions. The insurer should be given the respon-
sibility to make the policy's provisions clear. Courts should recognize that
vague policy provisions were created by the insurer, and that the responsi-
bility for the policy's vagueness lies with the insurer and not with the in-
sured. The insurer should not be allowed to hide behind vague provisions
when notice is delayed. A vague clause should be interpreted against the
drafter.1 88 Therefore, for the reasons discussed, Indiana courts should reas-
sess the current analysis of delayed notice, and eliminate the inequity re-
sulting to the insured under the current notice rule.
VII. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
This note proposes a solution that is grounded upon three premises.
The first premise is that timely notice requires that the insured know that
when an event occurs, the insurance policy covers the event and notice is
due. 39 The second premise is that an insurance policy is an adhesion con-
tract dominated by the insurer, with delayed notice due largely to vague
and unconscionable policy provisions.1' Finally, the third premise is that
the proposed solution must not threaten the insurer's financial interests.""
Insurance § 1342, at 272 (1982). This imputed knowledge should be qualified as the courts
have held that one experienced and trained in insurance has a superior knowledge of insurance
and when notice is due. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d 573, 578 (7th Cir.
1974). Also, a common occurrence in delayed notice cases has been a third party informing an
insured that notice is due. See Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974).
137. See supra note 80.
138. "The terms of an insurance policy should be construed liberally in favor of the
insured only if there is an ambiguity in the policy's langauge." Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d
257, 265 (Ind. 1984).
139. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text for a discussion on the concept of
notice and how knowledge is needed for giving notice.
140. See supra notes 120-38 and accompanying text for a discussion on the insurance
policy as an adhesion contract.
141. This premise is derived from the practical consideration of insurance as a business.
If the insurer is forced to undertake uncalculated and needless liabilities then either the insurer
can no longer function or will do so at too great a cost for the insured. See supra notes 97, 99,
100 for a discussion of how an insurer conducts its business.
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Based upon these three premises and the reasoning below, the best solution
is a balancing approach that would place upon the insurer the burden to
show prejudice and place upon the insured the burden of showing that his
actions were reasonable and in good faith.
The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that delayed notice creates a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the insurer.142 The Indiana Supreme
Court imposes the burden on the insured to prove that the insurer did not
suffer actual prejudice, without stating how the insured was to prove that
the insurer was not prejudiced. 43 The Indiana Court of Appeals, however,
gave substance to the question of how the insured was to prove that the
insurer had not suffered any prejudice. The court of appeals held that the
insured's success in defending himself, and hence the insurer, was insuffi-
cient to show that delayed notice did not prejudice the insurer. The court
reasoned that the insurer lacked a choice in counsel, the ability to guide the
litigation, and the ability to participate in settlement negotiations."" This
decision differed from other jurisdictions applying the same rule in regard
to similar facts, 145 and it also differed from another application of the same
rule of rebuttable presumption in Indiana. 1" The Reichhart decision
changed the rebuttable presumption created by the Indiana Supreme Court
into an irrebuttable presumption. The rule's metamorphosis is due to how
the rule is applied. This proposal to change the rule stems from faults in the
Reichhart decision; the premises of this proposed change are derived from
specific faults in the Indiana approach.
The first premise, that timely notice requires that the insured know
when notice must be given, requires an examination of the insured's actual
knowledge. Indicative of such knowledge are the insurance policy itself,1 47
the insured's knowledge of and experience with insurance, 48 and the in-
142. Miller, 463 N.E.2d 257.
143. Id. at 265. The Indiana Supreme Court said that the insured could find some evi-
dence that prejudice did not occur, and upon presenting such evidence, the question becomes
one for the trier of fact. Id. at 265-66. The insurer is able to introduce evidence of prejudice.
Id. at 266.
144. Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985). See also supra note 84.
145. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
147. In particular, the policy's language should be examined for determining how clearly
an event is covered. For if notice requires that the insured knows when notice is due and if the
delay is judged by a reasonableness standard, then the policy's language needs to be examined
to determine if the insured's ignorance was reasonable in light of the policy's language. See
supra note 106.
148. The best example of testing an insured's knowledge and experience is in Ohio Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1974). There, the insured, who had been
trained as a claims adjustor, was held to a higher standard of care than an ordinary insured.
id. at 579.
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sured's reasonable expectations of coverage."' 9 An excuse will fail if the
insured knew from the policy that coverage existed, or if he has personal
knowledge of coverage from training or experience in insurance. Yet, when
the insured does not know that notice is due, and has no access to informa-
tion before notice becomes untimely, the insured should be excused for
delayed notice. 50 The conclusion that notice is delayed should be attributa-
ble to the manner in which the insurer has written the policy. The insured
must know that notice must be given. Thus, the insured should only be
penalized for delayed notice when the insured knows that notice was due.
The second premise, that the insurance policy is an adhesion contract
and that vague policy provisions contribute to delayed notice, relates to the
insurer's control over the insurance policy.' 5 ' The insurer controls what pro-
visions the policy contains and the policy's language. 52 The corollary to
recognizing the insurance policy as an adhesion contract is that the insur-
ance policy gives information in the manner in which the insurer wishes it
to give information. Where the insurance policy is vague as to whether the
policy's coverage extends to a specific event, and the insured gives delayed
notice only after a third party informed him that coverage may exist, the
failure to give timely notice should be excused. The insurer controls the
policy's language, and has the ability to correct a provision's vagueness or
to give explanations to the insured outside of the policy. Where prevention
by the insurer is possible, the insurer should bear the burden for delayed
notice. Courts recognize that insurance serves an important social function
149. The insured's reasonable expectations are to be considered indicative of what the
insured thought he was buying with his premiums. The reasonable expectations doctrine has
been defined as providing coverage when the reasonably objective expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries would be negated by a specific provision. Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1971). As used here,
the reasonable expectations doctrine would operate only when the insured is lacking real
knowledge about the policy's coverage; real knowledge is defined as the explicit information
about the policy's coverage derived from either the policy or the insurer. See Young, Lewis &
Lee, supra note 71, at 78. In operation, an insured should be excused only when he did not
reasonably believe coverage existed. But see Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a
Principled Application, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 267 (1986) (reasonable expectations doctrine
as a covert judicial tool for reducing harshness in policy provisions).
150. The courts have interpreted an immediate notice requirement as meaning as soon
as practicable. The requirement is that the circumstances did not allow for notice to be given
earlier. 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, § 13.09; 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, §
4734; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 49:115. Yet, if the insured did not know that notice was
due, but gives notice upon acquiring such knowledge, then the notice should be considered as
having been given as soon as practicable.
151. See generally supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of adhe-
sion contracts.
152. See Trakman, supra note 119, at 24; and K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: IN-
SURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC THEORY 31-35 (1986) (discusses the inequitable bal-
ance favoring the insurer in terms of information and power).
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via spreading risk. The courts have protected this social policy by disfavor-
ing forfeitures when those forfeitures would injure the insured more than
the insurer. 5 ' In this manner, the courts have given the insured the same
protection that has been given to the parties to an adhesion contract.
The third premise, that a proper solution cannot ignore the insurer's
interests, is necessary to protect the insured's interests and the social bene-
fits of insurance. The insured is interested in having the protection of insur-
ance; insurance which benefits society by spreading the risk encountered by
individuals."" Neither the individual nor society will benefit from injuring
the insurer's business. If the insurer incurs uncalculated losses, unassumed
liability, then the cost of insurance will increase or the insurer will leave the
marketplace. 5 5 The insured will not benefit if insurance is too costly, and
society will not benefit from a mass of uninsured individuals. Therefore, the
insurer must bear the responsibility for vague policy provisions. However, a
limit must be established to maintain a balance between the insurer's liabil-
ity and the insured's expectations.
The proposed solution following from these three premises is a variant
of the reasonableness-of-the-delay rule. This solution is described best ac-
cording to the parties' evidentiary burdens. The insured has the burden of
showing that the event was not reasonably ascertainable from the insurance
policy, from his own experiences, or from the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions concerning coverage. In short, the insured must show that he did not
know that coverage existed and, hence, that notice was due.' The in-
sured's reasonable expectations are relevant since the insured did not con-
tribute to the drafting of the insurance policy, and since it is unlikely that
the insured has read the policy or understood what he may have read.' 57
The delay's length is relevant only in relation to how the insured discovered
that coverage existed and that notice was due. 58 These factors are to be
153. See generally supra note 67.
154. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 152, at 18-20 (philosophical bases and methods for
distributing risk). See supra notes 97, 99, 100 and accompanying text for more business-ori-
ented reasons and methods for risk distribution. See also Cooper v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
51 N.J. 86, 90, 237 A.2d 870, 874 (1968) (specific purpose of compensating negligence
victims).
155. This is a reasonable interpretation of the business methods of insurance. See supra
notes 97, 99, 100.
156. Allocating the burden of proof entails two considerations: who desires to change the
status quo, and which party has the access to the facts. C. MCCORMICK & E. CLEARY, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE 949-50 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. It is
assumed that the insured is the party seeking to change the status quo, and there are facts
lying peculiarly within the insured's knowledge. Id.
157. See also supra note 149 (discussing reasonable expectations).
158. It is logical to take into consideration the means by which the insured could have
shortened the notice delay. The insured is acting unreasonably if he knew he had resources
available to him and did not notify his insurer. The logical source for this information would
[Vol. 22
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used by the trier of fact in determining whether the insured had a reasona-
ble basis for his actions.
The insurer's burden is to show that its interests are prejudiced by the
delayed notice. If the insurer cannot show actual prejudice, then its con-
tractual obligations cannot be avoided. The proposed formulation of
prejudice is that if an event occurs which alters the liability that the insurer
assumed, prejudice occurs.'56 Thus, prejudice will depend upon each policy
because variations exist between different types of policies. The insurer will
need to show that delayed notice changes the basis upon which the risk of
liability was calculated so as to transform the liability into an uncalculated
risk. If, however, the delayed notice does not transform the liability into one
that was uncalculated, but, instead, only delays a calculated risk, then the
insurer should not be allowed to claim that its interests are prejudiced.
Since the information needed to show prejudice is in the insurer's control,
the insurer properly has the burden of proving prejudice.'
Upon completion of the insured's and the insurer's evidentiary burden,
the trier of fact will need to decide two issues. These issues are the delay's
reasonableness, and what prejudice to the insurer resulted from the delay.
While the facts of each case must determine the outcome for each issue, the
important item is that the insurer cannot escape liability unless the insured
acted unreasonably and in bad faith. In short, the insured will be protected
unless he knew that notice was due.
A further examination of how the trier of fact is to treat these issues
may be helpful. The first issue requires the use of the reasonably prudent
person and good faith standards. Since these standards have long been used
by the courts, their use in the delayed notice cases should not prove a con-
ceptual or practical hardship. What the trier must specifically decide is if a
reasonably prudent person - a person with the same knowledge of insur-
ance, the same insurance policy, and the same reasonable expectations of
coverage - would have made the same decision to not give notice. Here the
reasons for the length of the delay are relevant, for if the insured should
have obtained the requisite knowledge earlier than he actually did, then the
reasonableness and good faith of his delay becomes more questionable.
Assuming that the trier finds that the insured acted as a reasonably
be the insured's insurance agent, and this criterion was implicitly used by the Indiana Court of
Appeals. Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985). However, this inquiry is useless unless the insured had a reason to think that coverage
existed. The insured should be faulted where an inquiry is made, a concrete answer is given,
but the insured still does not take action.
159. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 397, 279 S.E.2d
769, 775 (1981).
160. See supra note 156.
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prudent person and in good faith, then the trier must address the issue of
prejudice. The issue of prejudice has two components: the risk of liability
assumed by the insurer and the actual damage caused by the delay to the
liability assumed. 16' If the trier finds that the insurer assumed liability for
an event and the insurer was not actually damaged, then the insurer is not
prejudiced. If the insurer is actually damaged by a reasonable delay, then
the damages must be apportioned by the time notice was delayed.162
The ordinary reasonableness-of-the-delay rule results in a conflict when
both prejudice and reasonableness of the delay occur. The result is that the
insurer might not be liable for the claim.'63 With the solution proposed in
this note, the insurer will be liable so long as the delay was reasonable and
in good faith. This result is justified because the test for reasonableness and
good faith includes an examination of the insured's insurance policy, knowl-
edge of insurance, and the reasonable expectations of the insured concern-
ing coverage. The insurer has the ability to correct any mistaken belief held
by the insured before the event requiring notice occurs. When the insurer
does not prevent an insured's mistaken beliefs concerning coverage, the in-
surer should not escape liability, for the insured is relying upon the insurer
to indicate when notice is due.'"
Principally there are four criticisms of the proposal: 1) that the pro-
posed rule will be an onerous burden to the insurer; 2) that the established
duties of the insured to read the policy 65 and to inquire about the extent of
161. By formulating prejudice as the change in risks assumed caused by the delay, then
these factors are relevant to the issue of prejudice.
162. Reichhart provides a useful example. In Reichhart, the notice was delayed until
after the insured won the claim for which he was seeking reimbursement of attorney's fees.
479 N.E.2d at 1341. Under this rule, the trier of fact would look to the fees and possible
settlements which an insurer had calculated in assuming liability. The trier of fact would then
compare the settlement offer actually made and the fees actually charged. The insurer would
then be liable for the amount calculated or the fees charged, whichever would be the lesser.
163. See Cooper v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 92, 237 A.2d 870, 873.
164. The author in his analysis of the expectation principle as a doctrine of equity notes:
First, if the insurer knew or should have known of the insured's expectations, the equities
weigh heavily in favor of holding it responsible for fulfilling them. . . . The policy would
be reformed to conform to the insured's expectations. Second, if the insurer also created
or helped create those expectations, equity would suggest even more strongly that those
expectations be fulfilled. The insurer would be estopped to deny the truth of the expecta-
tions it had induced. Finally, the insured's expectations must be reasonable before equity
should demand that they be honored. In most cases, this criterion will be met if one of
the other two is.
K. ABRAHAM, supra note 152, at 119.
165. "Older decisions, often now more honored in the breach, are replete with language
to the effect that an insured is under a positive duty to read the contract delivered to him, and,
under this antiquated rule, he will be presumed to have done so." I J. APPLEMAN & J. AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 173, at 531-32 (1981). See also 13A G. COUCH,
supra note 2, § 12:16; 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 218 (1982) (both agree with Appleman
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coverage are ignored; 6 3) that the burden of proof is changed to favor the
insured; and 4) that the insured is being favored at the insurer's expense. In
addressing the first three criticisms, the last and most general criticism will
also be addressed. Refuting the particular criticisms will also refute the
general criticism.
The first criticism, that the proposed rule is an onerous burden for the
insurer, neglects the power and control which the insurer possesses as the
dominant party to an adhesion contract."' 7 The insurer's power must in-
clude responsibility; the courts have already addressed this issue by protect-
ing the weaker party to the adhesion contract, the insured.'68 This proposal
seeks to create an affirmative duty for the insurer to plainly inform the
insured about which events require notice.'6 9 If the insured has been in-
formed about what events the policy covers, then the insured is not excused
when notice of an event is delayed. In short, this proposal only favors the
insured who has a vague insurance policy, is not fully knowledgeable about
insurance matters, and does not reasonably expect policy coverage, all of
which the insurer can easily correct.'
The first criticism ignores the insurer's power; the second criticism ig-
nores reality. The duty to read is often not performed by the insured,' and
the language may be too technical to be understood.17 2 The duty to inquire
and Appleman).
166. "Mere belief the injured person would not present a claim is not an excuse. The
insured must take some good faith steps to investigate the accident or there will be no valid
excuse for not reporting the occurrence." 13A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 49:14, at 239. See
also 8 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 4744; 2 R. LONG, supra note 1, §
13.12; 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1343 (1982).
167. An adhesion contract being by definition a contract with a dominant party, and an
insurance policy being an adhesion contract, the insurer is the dominant party. See Trakman,
supra note 121, at 24; Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 71, at 74; Patterson, supra note 118,
at 856; R. MEHR & E. CAMMACH, supra note 96, at 162.
168. See generally, 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 900; see also Young,
Lewis & Lee, supra note 71, at 75 (judicial intervention to protect consumers based on an
adhesion contract theory); and Mayhew, supra note 149, at 272 (reasonable expectation doc-
trine evolved from judicial concern for insureds).
169. Generally speaking, a plain English insurance policy uses non-technical language;
hence the term "plain English." See Comment, supra note 14, at 581-83 (explanation of plain
English insurance policies). See also I G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2D § 1:16 (rev. ed. 1982) (criticizes plain language policies as litigation breeders).
170. The plain language policy would be the most direct and efficient method to inform
insured's about coverage. This would provide a written, standardized and relatively permanent
memorial of coverage. But see Id. Auxiliary means, such as oral instructions or brochures,
either do not have the benefits of a plain English policy, or may face difficulties with the parol
evidence rule.
171. See generally Murray, Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement,
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1982).
172. That technical language leads insureds astray has resulted in state statutes that
require plain language in insurance policies. See I G. COUCH, supra note 169, § 1:16 (gives
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is useless unless the insured has a cause to inquire.' In short, these duties
operate as a trap for the unsophisticated insured. 17 "4 Allowing these rules to
trap the insured will ruin the judicial rule against needless insurance for-
feitures. These forfeitures will be needless, since under this proposal the
insurer's interest is in fully informing the insured about the extent of the
policy's coverage.
Finally, the criticism that the burden of proof favors the insured ex-
poses nothing more than did the first two criticisms. The insured simply
cannot show reasonableness if the insurer has explained the policy's cover-
age or the policy is clear about its coverage. Nor is changing the burden of
proof technically incorrect. Generally, the burden of proof is allocated ac-
cording to which party is trying to change the status quo and which party
has access to information. 1" The insured has the burden of proof concern-
ing his reasonableness, while the insurer has the burden of showing how and
what prejudice resulted from the delay. Each party has the needed access to
the facts necessary to meet its evidentiary burden; the insurer knows how
its calculated risk has been altered and the insured knows how and why he
delayed notice. The insurer is protected further because he can rebut the
insured with a showing that the insured was fully informed that a particular
event was covered by the policy. The insurer will be in a more desireable
position under this proposal than under the present rule if the insured has
been fully informed of the policy's coverage.
These criticisms do not show that the proposed solution overwhelm-
ingly favors the insured. On the contrary, if the insured has been fully in-
formed that an event is covered by his insurance policy and such an event
occurs but notice is delayed, then the insurer is not liable for the event. This
examples of such statutes).
173. "Insureds, however, will often unjustifiably delay notice to the insurer in an at-
tempt to discern whether they are liable, rather than placing that burden upon the insurer.
They don't want to risk antagonizing the insurer when no actual liability exists on their part."
Comment, supra note 9, at 262-63. This behavior would be prevented if the insured was
clearly informed about events creating liability. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 579 n.70
and accompanying text.
174. One writer notes:
It seems harsh for the court in the principal case to impute knowledge of the insurer's
mistake to the insured since it appears to be customary and reasonable for an insured not
to read his policy. However, the insurance company should be charged with notice of the
contents of the issued policy since any mistake in issuing the policy would be due to its
own negligence.
Case Note, Insurance - Charging the Insured with Notice of the Contents of the Policy, 30
TEx. L. REV. 634, 635 (1952) (oriented towards a particular case, but particularly enlighten-
ing as to its date and the recognition that insureds were unlikely to read their policies).
See also I J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 165, § 173 (details the pitfalls of
the duty-to-read rule).
175. See supra note 156.
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proposal merely adjusts the equities of power and information between in-
surer and insured. This is accomplished by requiring that the insurer fully
inform the insured concerning what events require notice, and by changing
the burden of proof to avoid the problems that the Indiana rule has with
access to information and proving a negative fact.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Indiana Supreme Court created a difficult burden of proof prob-
lem for an insured who delays notice of a claim against the insurer. Specifi-
cally, the burden of proof problem is the presumption created by the delay:
whenever notice is delayed a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the in-
surer arises, which can only be rebutted by the insured's showing that the
delay did not prejudice the insurer. This rule puts great emphasis upon the
delay's length and the insurer's interests; this rule is rooted in the charac-
terization of notice as a contractual condition precedent. Futhermore, the
Indiana rule in Miller176 fails to recognize the nature of insurance con-
tracts, and fails to protect the insured.
The first application of the Miller rule by the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals, in Milwaukee Guardian Insurance, Inc. v. Reichhart,"' pointed out
the problems with the rule. Reichhart shows that the rule inequitably favors
the insurer over the insured. The Miller rule's inequity stems from a reluc-
tance to view an insurance policy as an adhesion contract with the insurer
as the dominant party, a reluctance to believe that delayed notice can be
caused by vague policy provisions which are written by the insurer, and an
outright refusal to place the burden of proving prejudice upon the insurer,
the party best able to show prejudice. The Reichhart decision demonstrates
the faults of the Miller rule. 178
The proposal is offered as a solution to the problems created by Miller
and demonstrated in Reichhart. Specifically, the proposal is the means of
evaluating whether a reasonable person would have understood the insur-
ance policy's provision that requires notice for the particular event in ques-
tion in a specific case. This change requires that timely notice be given only
when the insured knows that notice must be given, and that the party gen-
erating the policy provisions, the insurer, should bear the burden of vague
176. 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984).
177. 479 N.E.2d 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
178. The Miller court believed that an "insured party can establish some evidence that
prejudice did not occur in the particular situation." Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265. Once the
injured party has presented its evidence of no prejudice, the insurer is to present its evidence of
prejudice, and the trier of fact will then decide the issue. Id. at 265-66. In Reichhart, the
emphasis on the time elapsed before notice was given and how even successful litigation can
cause prejudice turns the idea that "some evidence" can establish no prejudice jejune.
Reichhart, 479 N.E.2d at 1343.
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policy provisions. Likewise, the insured and the insurer are given production
of evidence burdens appropriate to their knowledge and roles: the insured
must produce evidence supporting his reasons for delay and the insurer
must produce evidence proving that its interests have been prejudiced.
The reasonableness-of-the-delay rule is posed to solve the inequities
and inadequacies of the present rule. Therefore, this note has been careful
to limit the grounds for excusing delayed notice and to offer possible means
for the insurer to further limit causes for delayed notice. The purpose for
limiting the excuses for delayed notice and for offering preventative mea-
sures is to leave to the insurer, as the dominant party, the opportunity to
make these appropriate changes and to permit continued functioning of the
insurance industry. Therefore, the reasonableness-of-the-delay rule is in-
tended to equalize a relationship which is currently unequal between in-
surer and insured and not to replace inequality with inequality.
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